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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins is most famous for its holding that federal courts sitting in 
diversity must apply the law of the state and that there is “no federal 
general common law.”1 What the decision is not famous for is identifying 
* Sharon K. Sandeen is the Robins Kaplan LLP Distinguished Professor in Intellectual Property Law 
and Director of the IP Institute at Mitchell Hamline School of Law in St. Paul Minnesota. The title of 
this article and portions of its content are derived from her earlier article, The Evolution of Trade 
Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493 (2010) (hereinafter The Evolution of Trade Secret Law). Based upon an 
examination of hundreds of pages of source documents, including archival records of the American 
Bar Association (ABA) and the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL), now known as the Uniform Law Commission, that article details the background, history, 
and purpose of the Uniform Trade Secret Act, showing that it was primarily designed to limit, rather 
than to expand, trade secret protection. In so doing, it tells the story of the active role that various 
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the vacuum in law that the decision created and how the then existing 
federal general common law would be replaced. 
For almost 150 years from the adoption of the Federal Judiciary Act 
of 1789 until the Court’s decision in Erie in 1938, the federal judiciary 
had developed a body of federal jurisprudence that applied (if not created) 
what the federal courts thought was the “general common law.”2 Then, 
with one decision, that body of jurisprudence was rendered moot. 
Henceforth, Erie directed federal courts to look to both statutory and 
decisional state law in cases that are brought pursuant to the diversity 
jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
Ironically, the decision in Erie (which overruled the longstanding 
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson3) was based, in part, on Justice Holmes’s 
argument in an earlier case that the Swift doctrine rests on the fallacy that 
there is “one august corpus [of common law].”4 The irony being that if 
there was no one corpus of common law, there was not much for the state 
courts to rely upon either. Thus, while Erie is primarily about who gets to 
decide what the common law is, and the limited power of the federal 
courts, the practical effect of the decision was that it left gaps in the law 
that took decades to fill. This was particularly true in areas of law where 
state common law had not developed sufficiently, like unfair competition 
law. 
Because much of the federal general common law concerned matters 
of commercial law,5 including principles of unfair competition, Erie’s 
effect on unfair competition was substantial. As a commentator of the time 
explained: 
Whatever the merits of the Tompkins case in other respects, it seems to 
me very damaging to the law of Unfair Competition. State litigation in 
the field is infrequent. Thus, the argument in favor of the result in the 
Tompkins case . . . is of slight efficacy when applied to Unfair 
Competition. 
lawyers and Bar Associations played in trying to shape the law of unfair competition in the aftermath 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie.   
1. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
2. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842); Robert H. Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson, 
24 A.B.A. J. 609, 611–614 (1938) (noting that the Swift doctrine “grew by what it fed on” and 
summarizing the issues upon which federal courts applied general common law pre-Erie). 
3. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
4. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (J. Holmes dissenting). 
5. Robert H. Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson, 24 A.B.A. J. 609, 613 (1938)
(“Perhaps the chief beneficiaries of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson were corporations doing business 
in a number of states.”). 
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Moreover, state doctrines have not been continuously developed. Some 
of the few state cases are decades old, decided before judges understood 
the problems. There is very little good reasoning on this subject in any 
single state, as compared with the extensive and admirable body of 
federal law now apparently doomed to destruction.6 
This article tells the story of the efforts undertaken in the aftermath of Erie 
to fill the gaps it left in the law of unfair competition. As used herein, the 
law of unfair competition refers to causes of action that might be brought 
by competitors as opposed to consumer-related, unfair competition 
claims. However, there is some overlap in these two areas of law, 
particularly with respect to false advertising claims brought by the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) or pursuant to so-called state “little-FTC 
Acts.”7 
Proceeding chronologically, the first part of this article explains the 
scope and nature of the gaps in law that resulted from Erie with a focus 
on the law of unfair competition. Part II of this article discusses how 
policymakers and members of the bar (particularly the American Bar 
Association) attempted to address the gaps in unfair competition law that 
Erie left behind, and how the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions in 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.8 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc.9 in 1964 effectively limited the scope of those efforts by 
creating what I previously dubbed the “Erie/Sears/Compco squeeze.”10 
The squeeze refers to the fact that while the Supreme Court in Erie told 
federal courts to look to state common law when sitting in diversity, the 
Court later ruled in the Sears and Compco decisions that much of the 
unfair competition law of the states was preempted by federal patent law. 
Thus, the Erie/Sears/Compco squeeze raised serious questions about the 
ability of state law to fill the gaps in unfair competition law left by Erie. 
Indeed, for a period of time until the Supreme Court decided Kewanee Oil 
6. Zechariah. Chafee, Jr., Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1940), as abstracted 
in 7 CURRENT LEGAL THOUGHT 3 (1940). Interestingly, despite Professor Chafee’s sentiment, the 
American Law Institute (ALI) thought the state law of unfair competition had developed enough so 
that it could be restated in the Restatement (First) of the Law of Torts published in 1939. 
7. See Jack E. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices Under “Little Ftc Acts”: 
Should Federal Standards Control?, 94 DICK. L. REV. 373, 375 (1990) (“The passage of state Little 
FTC Acts was in large part a response to the deficiencies in the common law as well as the limited 
reach of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA). Courts interpreted the FTCA’s section 
5 enforcement power narrowly to encompass only anti-competitive practices between businesses.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
8. 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
9. See 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
10. Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 507
(2010). 
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Co. v. Bicron Corp.11 in 1974, the Erie/Sears/Compco squeeze even 
threatened the common law of trade secrecy that had developed in the 
United States over the course of more than 100 years. In the concluding 
part of this article, the current state of the law governing unfair 
competition is summarized leading to the ultimate and ironic conclusion 
that eighty years after Erie, the federal courts are back in the business of 
developing and refining the common law of unfair competition. 
II. THE GAPS LEFT BY ERIE
To understand the gaps in the law that were left in the wake of Erie, 
one has to understand what the federal courts at the time of Erie meant by 
federal general common law.12 It is clear that it did not include either 
federal or state statutory law; less obvious is that it did not include all 
common law, but only a sub-set of the common law that the federal courts 
deemed to be general law. The quote from Swift v. Tyson set forth in Erie 
explains the distinction: 
The true interpretation of the 34th section [of the Federal Judiciary Act] 
limited its application to state laws, strictly local, that is to say, to the 
positive statutes of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by the 
local tribunals, and to rights and titles to things having a permanent 
locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate, and other matters 
immovable and intraterritorial in their nature and character. It never 
has been supposed by us, that the section did apply, or was designed to 
apply, to questions of a more general nature, not at all dependent upon 
local statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent operation, as, for 
example, to the construction of ordinary contracts or other written 
instruments, and especially to questions of general commercial law, 
where the state tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions 
as ourselves, that is, to ascertain, upon general reasoning and legal 
analogies, what is the true exposition of the contract or instrument, or 
what is the just rule furnished by the principles of commercial law to 
govern the case.13 
As so described, at least at the time of Swift, the general law had three 
features that might exist alone or in combination: (1) it is not intra-
territorial; (2) it concerns matters of commercial law; and; (3) it requires 
11. 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
12. The post-Erie definition of this phrase is different. Now, federal general common law refers 
to federal decisional law which has interpreted federal statutes and filled gaps in those statutes.  
13. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (quoting Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1842) 
(emphasis added). 
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the application of general reasoning and legal analogies.14 All three 
features apply to unfair competition claims, particularly in diversity cases 
where, by definition, the parties are likely to be engaged in interstate 
commerce. 
A criticism of the Swift doctrine that led to it being overruled by Erie 
was that it gave federal judges too much discretion to decide whether an 
issue was a matter of general law, often leading them to ignore state law 
in situations that appeared to be local and intra-territorial.15 In Black & 
White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer 
Co. (a decision criticized by Justice Holmes in a dissent ultimately leading 
to Erie), for instance, the court considered a case alleging interference 
with contract wherein the plaintiff complained that the defendant was not 
honoring its exclusive contract with a railroad to provide transportation 
and baggage handling services.16 The defendant countered with the 
argument that “the contract is contrary to the public policy and laws of 
Kentucky as declared by its highest court, and that it is monopolistic in 
excess of the railroad company’s charter power and violates section 214 
of the Constitution of the state.”17 Despite the applicability of the 
Kentucky Constitution and the apparent localized nature of the dispute, 
however, the Supreme Court refused to apply Kentucky law, explaining: 
The cases cited show that the decisions of the Kentucky Court of 
Appeals holding such arrangements invalid are contrary to the common 
law as generally understood and applied. And we are of opinion that 
petitioner here has failed to show any valid ground for disregarding this 
contract and that its interference cannot be justified. Care is to be 
observed lest the doctrine that a contract is void as against public policy 
be unreasonably extended. Detriment to the public interest is not to be 
presumed in the absence of showing that something improper is done or 
contemplated.18 
14. In the almost 100 years following the Supreme Court’s decision in Swift v. Tyson, the
definition of “general law” had expanded to include most common-law fields, including wills, 
contracts, torts, deeds, mortgages, rules of evidence, and measures of damages and industrial 
torts. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Ex Parte Young and the Transformation of the Federal Courts, 1890-
1917, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 931, 947 (2009). 
15. Erie, 304 U.S. 64, 75 (“This resulted in part from the broad province accorded to the so-
called ‘general law’ as to which federal courts exercised an independent judgment.”), citing H. Parker 
Sharp & Joseph B. Brennan, The Application of the Doctrine of Swift v. Tyson since 1900, 4 IND. L. 
J. 367 (1929). 
16. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown 7 Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518, 528 (1928). 
17. Id. at 523. 
18. Id. at 528. 
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In justifying its refusal to follow the applicable law of Kentucky, the Court 
explained: “There is no question concerning title to land. No provision of 
state statute or Constitution and no ancient or fixed local usage is 
involved.”19 In other words, if the dispute was not local enough, federal 
judges pre-Erie felt free to determine what the law is and, in many cases, 
what it should be.20 
 The Court in Black & White listed the types of issues that had 
previously been considered matters of general law, including: 
construction of a will; construction of a deed; what constitutes negligence; 
what constitutes dedication of land to the public; the public purpose that 
warrants municipal taxation; the liability of common carriers for injury; 
the validity of a contract for the carriage of goods; and a railroad’s 
responsibility for personal injuries.21 
While not all involve issues of contract or commercial law, each of 
the listed types of cases contain one or more of the features of general law 
described above, and most involve business or transportation activities. 
This suggests that the federal courts before Erie thought that they had an 
important role to play in overseeing the business practices of companies 
operating across state lines. With this mindset, it is not surprising that a 
body of federal unfair competition jurisprudence developed pre-Erie. A 
famous example is the Supreme Court’s decision in International News 
Service v. Associated Press (INS).22 
Decided in 1918, 20 years before Erie and at a time when the federal 
courts were expanding their equity jurisdiction, INS is famous for 
recognizing a common law claim for the misappropriation of information, 
which is often referred to as the “INS misappropriation doctrine.”23 INS 
involved a lawsuit in equity based on diversity jurisdiction that was 
brought by the Associated Press (AP) against International News Service 
(INS) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York.24 Without reference to an applicable statute, AP alleged that INS’s 
actions of pirating its new stories were inequitable and constituted unfair 
19. Id. at 529. 
20. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Ex Parte Young and the Transformation of the Federal Courts, 
1890-1917, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 931 (2009) (detailing the expanding role of the federal judiciary 
between the Supreme Court’s decisions in Swift and Erie, including the expansion of its equity 
jurisdiction).  
21. Black & White, 276 U.S. at 530–31. 
22. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
23. See Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International 
News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411 (1983) (explaining the common law 
development of the INS misappropriation doctrine through the early 1980s). 
24. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 229–30. 
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competition that should be enjoined.25 The Supreme Court agreed, 
applying the federal general common law of unfair competition that had 
developed to that point. 
The parties are competitors in this field; and, on fundamental principles, 
applicable here as elsewhere, when the rights or privileges of the one are 
liable to conflict with those of the other, each party is under a duty so to 
conduct its own business as not unnecessarily or unfairly to injure that 
of the other.26 
Although not specifically identified, the fundamental principles upon 
which the court relied apparently include (as discussed in a cited case 
involving a labor dispute) the right of businesses to engage in fair 
competition and freedom to contract including with respect to 
employment relationships.27 
The district court that first considered the INS case and granted the 
injunction on appeal to the Supreme Court succinctly summarized the 
federal court’s view of unfair competition circa 1918 with respect to the 
perceived wrongful use of information: 
The protection of lectures, plays, and paintings from piracy, even after 
wide publicity, is sometimes placed by the courts upon rights of authors 
to literary or artistic property, and sometimes upon the theory of an 
implied contract arising from the relations of the parties. . . . The 
question in any given case is whether abandonment to the public has 
been so complete that no further justifiable cause remains for protecting 
these business interests from competitive interference. They do stand 
like trade secrets, in that they are entitled to protection until surrendered 
to the public; but the real basis for invoking equitable aid either in the 
case of a lecture, a play, or a trade secret is that one who has, with labor 
and expense, created something which, while intangible, is yet of value, 
is entitled to such protection against damage as is not inconsistent with 
public policy.28 
When viewed in the context of current law (discussed in the last part of 
this article), the foregoing language reveals how much the law of unfair 
competition concerning the protection of information has changed since 
1918. This is due to the ancillary effects of Erie, but is also explained by 
the Erie/Sears/Compco squeeze and developments in U.S. copyright law 
25. Id. at 215, 230–31. 
26. Id. at 235–36 (1918) (emphasis added), citing Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 
U.S. 229, 254 (1917). 
27. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 251–54 (1917). 
28. Associated Press v. Int’l News Serv., 240 F. 983, 992–93 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), modified, 245 
F. 244 (2d Cir. 1917), aff’d, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
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including the Supreme Court’s holding in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co. which rejected the sweat-of-the-brow doctrine.29 
Prior to Erie, the federal courts had also developed a robust body of 
jurisprudence related to trademarks that was a part of the general law of 
unfair competition.30 In fact, the district court in INS—quoting National 
Telegraph News Co. v. Western Union31 and citing a book on trademark 
law written by Professor Langdell—used this law to further justify its 
decision. Thus, while unfair competition law was not the only type of 
“federal general common law” that was rendered moot by Erie, it was a 
very significant part. 
Following the decision in Erie, a series of federal cases noted the 
changes that Erie caused to the law of unfair competition. An early 
example is Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. American Expansion Bolt 
& Manufacturing Co. in which the plaintiff, relying upon the reasoning of 
INS, alleged that that defendant had misappropriated a business system 
originated by it.32 In dismissing the plaintiff’s arguments and ruling in 
favor of the defendant in a manner inconsistent with the pre-Erie general 
federal common law, the court explained: 
It appears that the lower court decided the case upon general Federal 
law. At any rate, it is certain that the law of unfair competition, as 
announced by the courts of Illinois, was not applied. We are therefore at 
the threshold of our consideration met with defendant’s contention that 
under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, the law of the state, as announced by its 
courts, must be given effect, and that by such law, no cause of action 
was stated or proved. 
Confronted with this situation, no good purpose could be served in 
analyzing the many Federal cases relied upon by plaintiff in support of 
29. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
30. See Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Law’s Faux Federalism, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND THE COMMON LAW 288–310 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (“In the pre-Erie era, it was 
reasonably clear that this common law of trademarks and unfair competition was general law, 
although there is some controversy about the status of that general law.”). 
31. 119 F. 294 (1902). The court in National Telegraph, summarized the federal law of
trademarks as follows: 
Nowhere is this recognition by courts of equity of the intangible side of property better 
exemplified, than in the remedies recently developed against unfair competition in trade. 
An unregistered trade name or mark is, in essence, nothing more than a symbol, conveying 
to eye and ear information respecting origin and identity; as if the manufacturer, present 
in person, and pointing to the article, were to say, “These are mine”; and the injunctive 
remedy applied is simply a command that this form of speech—this method of saying, 
These are mine—shall not be intruded upon unfairly by a like speech of another. 
32. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Am. Expansion Bolt & Mfg. Co., 124 F.2d 706, 708–
09 (7th Cir. 1941). 
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the decree. This is so for the reason that the law of unfair competition, 
as announced in Illinois, must be applied.33 
Similarly, in a trademark infringement case based upon diversity 
jurisdiction and decided a few years after Erie, the same court held that 
“[w]hatever may be the rule in the Federal Court, however, we think the 
state court rule must be applied.”34 As recognized in Philco Corp. v. 
Phillips Manufacturing Co., this is true even if the underlying lawsuit is 
one sounding in equity.35 But as also noted in Philco, state law does not 
apply to claims based upon infringement of a federal statutory trademark 
or unfair competition against a federal statutory trademark.36  
In 1957, nearly 20 years after Erie, a district court summarized the 
uncertainty that Erie caused with respect to unfair competition law as 
follows: 
The law of unfair competition has largely been developed in the federal 
courts, and most unfair competition cases are still brought there. Since 
Erie, however, many of the federal courts have felt compelled to ignore 
their own precedents and rely instead on old state decisions. The result, 
as can be seen from reading the federal cases cited in support of Illinois, 
law is an endless exegesis on a perhaps antiquated decision instead of a 
dynamic approach to decisional law. If the federal courts also feel 
themselves bound to follow the conflicts of laws rules of the state in 
which they sit, they might be further tying the Gordian knot of interstate 
conflicts jumbles.37 
If the state law of unfair competition had been as robust and clear as the 
federal general common law of unfair competition or resulted in similar 
outcomes, few would have cared. But because unfair competition law was 
perceived as having changed dramatically, particularly with respect to its 
lack of uniformity (national uniformity as opposed to the type of 
33. Id. at 708 (internal citations omitted). 
34. Rytex Co. v. Ryan, 126 F.2d 952, 954 (7th Cir. 1942); see also, Pecheur Lozenge Co. v.
Nat’l Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666, 667 (1942) (“The only cause of action that this record could possibly 
support is for unfair competition and common law ‘trademark infringement,’ to which local law 
applies.”) But see Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 113 (1938) (ignoring state law in 
the aftermath of Erie by noting “no claim has been made that the local law is any different from the 
general law on the subject, and both parties have relied almost entirely on federal precedents.”). 
35. Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 1943); see also, John R.
Peterson, The Legislative Mandate of Sears Compco: A Plea for a Federal Law of Unfair 
Competition, 56 TRADEMARK REP. 16, 25 (1966) (“The result of Erie in the field of unfair 
competition, has been a bewildering hodge-podge of conflicting decisions which defies harmonization 
into a uniform national body of law.”). 
36. 133 F. 2d at 667. 
37. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 151 F. Supp. 28, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), modified, 253 F.2d 702 
(2d Cir. 1958) (internal citations omitted).  
9
Sandeen: <i>Erie/Sears/Compco</i> Squeeze
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
432 AKRON LAW REVIEW [52:423 
uniformity discussed in Erie), businesses and their attorneys cared a lot as 
the following discussion explains. 
III. RESPONSES TO CHANGES IN THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
CAUSED BY ERIE 
Eighty years removed from the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie, it 
is hard to imagine the uproar that Erie caused among the practicing bar 
and U.S. business interests.38 Precisely at the time that the United States 
was emerging from the effects of The Great Depression; business and 
industry was becoming less localized and more national and international; 
and the need for national legal standards became more pronounced, the 
Supreme Court prevented federal courts from recognizing and applying 
the federal general common law of commerce that many believed 
existed.39 The impact of Erie upon the law of unfair competition was of 
particular concern to U.S. business interests. Explaining this impact, one 
commentator said: “The Supreme Court has brought to life volcanoes that 
existed, but were peacefully dormant, and which now may erupt in such a 
manner as to create a chaotic condition in our present-day interstate 
economy.”40 
Initially, the concern related to the inability of courts to rely upon 
federal precedents to define the parameters of unfair competition in the 
United States.41 Because of Erie, the federal judiciary was out of the 
business of developing common law except in connection with the 
interpretation and application of federal statutes, meaning the 
development and refinement of unfair competition law was left to state 
38. See E. Manning Giles, Unfair Competition and the Overextension of the Erie Doctrine, 41 
TRADEMARK REP. 1056 (1951); Edward S. Rogers, New Concepts of Unfair Competition Under the 
Lanham Act, 38 TRADEMARK REP. 259 (1948); Sergei S. Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to 
the Law of Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 955 (1942), as reprinted in 32 
TRADEMARK REP. 81, 99 (1942); Harry Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson, 47 YALE L. J. 1336 
(1938); see also, Brief in Support of Congressional Passage of Proposed Unfair Competition 
Amendment to Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, as reprinted in 57 TRADEMARK REP. 88 (1967) 
[hereinafter Brief in Support of Congressional Passage]. 
39. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 at 78; see also Statement of W.G. Reynolds in Support 
of Unfair Activities Bill, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 785 (1964) (noting the swing to direct selling, the 
increased importance of advertising, and the “mushrooming of supermarkets” as creating a new 
economic environment where federal principles of unfair competition are needed).  
40. Zlinkoff, supra note 38 at 90. 
41. Id. at 85–86, lamenting that the pre-Erie federal jurisprudence governing trademarks and
unfair competition had been sent to the “scrap heap.” 
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courts.42 However, “the rub was that state law marked time during the 
period that federal law was evolving” and had not developed sufficiently 
or consistently.43 Thus, as Erie forced lawyers and their clients to learn 
more about principles of unfair competition at the state level, the concern 
about the irrelevance of federal precedents was replaced by a fear about 
the actual details (or lack thereof) of state unfair competition law. Further 
exacerbating this concern was the realization that what state unfair 
competition law did exist often lacked uniformity and, pursuant to the 
Supreme Court’s 1941 decision in Klaxon v. Stentor Electric 
Manufacturing Co., Inc.,44 state conflict of laws rules might require 
application of the law of a state other than the state where the lawsuit was 
filed.45 Thus, the concern of the Erie Court about the lack of uniformity 
in law as between state and federal courts was replaced by a concern about 
the lack of uniformity in the state laws governing unfair competition. 
The responses to the lack of national uniformity and the gaps in the 
law of unfair competition that Erie caused can be divided into three 
periods of time: (1) the period between the Erie decision in 1938 and the 
adoption of Lanham Act46 on July 5, 1946 (the Pre-Legislative Era); (2) 
the period between the adoption of the Lanham Act in 1946 and the late 
1950s when it became clear that the trend of decisional law would limit 
the scope of the Lanham Act (the Federal Code of Unfair Competition 
Era); and (3) the period from the late 1950s until the promulgation of the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act in 1979 (the Uniform State Law Era). As 
further explained in the subsections that follow, the first period was 
marked by efforts to limit the scope and application of the Erie doctrine. 
During the second period, the focus was on arguing for an expansive 
application of the Lanham Act. When both of those efforts failed, 
legislative efforts shifted to the adoption of uniform state laws, but as 
ultimately constrained by principles of federal preemption. 
42. Giles, supra note 38, at 1056 (discussing the difference between federal general common
law and federal common law and noting the power of federal courts to construe and supplement 
federal statutory law). 
43. National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, Revised Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Prefatory Note (1966) (reprinted in Richard F. Dole, Jr., Uniform 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act: A Prefatory Note, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 435, 435–36 (1964)). 
44. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
45. Zlinkoff, supra note 38 at 88. 
46. Lanham Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1051-1141 (2010)); cf. H. M. McLarin, The 1941 Revised Lanham Trade-Mark Bill—Being a 
Description and History of the 1941 Revision of the Lanham Trade-Mark Bill, 31 TRADEMARK REP. 
87 (1941) (giving the reasons for the Lanham Bill, including the need of modern business for more 
certainty). 
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A. The Pre-Legislative Era 
In the immediate aftermath of Erie, those who were concerned about 
its effects on the law of unfair competition focused most of their time and 
effort advocating for its limited application. First and foremost, they noted 
that the Erie doctrine did not apply to the federal courts’ interpretation of 
matters “governed by the Federal Constitution, or by Acts of Congress,”47 
but they also suggested other restrictions on the scope of the Erie 
doctrine.48 For instance, an argument was made that the Erie doctrine 
should not apply to issues of equity, but that argument was quickly 
dismissed by the Supreme Court in Ruhlin v. New York Life Insurance 
Co., decided only a week after Erie in a matter that sought the rescission 
of an insurance policy.49 Without directly addressing the issue of law vs. 
equity, the Court matter-of-factly explained: “The parties and the federal 
courts must now search for and apply the entire body of substantive law 
governing an identical action in the state courts.”50 Justice Jackson 
presented a more nuanced view of the scope of Erie in his concurrence in 
D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. when he 
argued that the Erie doctrine should be limited to diversity cases and that 
federal courts should be allowed to develop and apply federal common 
law in all federal question cases.51 Ultimately, however, the circumstances 
allowing federal courts to create federal common law in federal question 
cases was limited such that state common law, rather than federal common 
law, is often used to fill the gaps that exist in federal statutes.52 
In a 1942 article, Sergei Zlinkoff argued that despite the ruling in 
Ruhlin, there were several reasons why the effects of Erie on the law of 
unfair competition might not be as great as feared.53 First, he noted “the 
47. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 at 78. 
48. Robert L. Stearns, Erie Railroad Versus Tompkins: One Year After, 12 ROCKY MNTN. L. 
REV. 1 (1939) (summarizing the results of post-Erie diversity cases, including arguments that were 
made to distinguish Erie.)  
49. Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938). See also, Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99 (1945). 
50. Ruhlin, 304 U.S. at 209. 
51. D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 471 (1942). 
A federal court sitting in a non-diversity case such as this does not sit as a local tribunal. 
In some cases it may see fit for special reasons to give the law of a particular state highly 
persuasive or even controlling effect, but in the last analysis its decision turns upon the 
law of the United States, not that of any state.  
52. See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4514-20 
(3d ed. 2016). See also, Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal 
Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law, 32 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 829 (2017) (discussing this rule’s 
probable application to the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016). 
53. Zlinkoff, supra note 38 at 81. 
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relative freedom of the federal courts with respect to local law,” 
particularly in states where there was not a robust law of unfair 
competition.54 Without clear state law, federal courts would be free to 
predict what the state law would be, noting that “[t]he entire body of 
jurisprudence upon which a state court would draw is the material out of 
which the federal court is free to mold its decision.”55 Second, he argued 
that the federal common law of unfair competition was likely to still be 
resorted to by federal courts for two reasons: (1) because inadequate 
guidance existed at the state level; and (2) because state court decisions 
often were based on federal precedents and doctrines.56 Buttressing this 
argument was his observation that the fact-specific nature of unfair 
competition cases would likely make state court precedents 
distinguishable anyway.57 Lastly, he noted the federal common law that 
would develop (at least in the area of trademark law) with respect to the 
federal court’s interpretation of the federal trademark statutes.58 
With respect to the federal common law that could still develop 
concerning the interpretation and application of the U.S. Constitution and 
federal statutes, commentators have argued for an expansive view of the 
federal courts’ power.59 In his 1951 article, E. Manning Giles observed 
that fears about the scope of Erie were often the result of a failure to 
distinguish between federal general common law and federal common law 
noting that the Supreme Court has “never squarely considered the 
question of whether the federal decisional law of unfair competition is part 
of the federal general common law or the federal common law.”60 Based 
upon the body of federal unfair competition statutes that had been adopted 
before and since Erie, including the Lanham Act, international treaties, 
and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, Giles argued that federal 
decisional concepts of unfair competition “ceased merely to be part of the 
federal general common law and became a part of federal common law.”61 
54. Id. at 90. 
55. Id. See also, id. at 93 (“[T]he trend of decisions indicates that if there is a statutory frame-
work, there are almost endless opportunities for the continued application of federal common law as 
the source of rules not only for those matters directly within the legislative enactment, but of cognate 
and interstitial issues as well.”). 
56. Id. at 92. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 93. 
60. Giles, supra note 38, at 1059. (emphasis omitted). 
61. Giles, supra note 38, at 1058. 
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B. The Federal Code of Unfair Competition Era 
While efforts to limit the reach of the Erie doctrine continued,62 
attention was also given to possible legislative solutions to “the Erie 
problem,” particularly after the adoption of a federal unfair competition 
law which could provide the basis for the development of more federal 
common law on the topic. This era had three stages. The first stage 
concerned the adoption of the Lanham Act, a process that had started 
before the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie but that did not come to 
fruition until 1946. The second stage, which largely overlapped the third 
stage, involved efforts to convince the courts to interpret the Lanham Act 
as creating a “Federal Code of Unfair Competition” with a broad and 
flexible definition of unfair competition. The third stage involved efforts 
to amend the Lanham Act to statutorily clarify that it was intended as a 
federal law of unfair competition by, among other things, defining 
additional acts of unfair competition. 
The Federal Code of Unfair Competition Era began with the adoption 
of the Lanham Act on July 5, 1946, which went into effect one year later.63 
Most accounts of the history of the Lanham Act do not include any 
suggestion that it was due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie, 
although the Lanham Act’s role in addressing the unfair competition 
concerns raised by Erie is readily acknowledged. The more common story 
is that the Lanham Act was needed to: (1) address perceived inadequacies 
in the scope of existing federal trademark law, particularly with respect to 
the protection of unregistered marks that are used in interstate commerce; 
(2) comply with international obligations; and (3) stem the proliferation 
of state trademark laws advocated by lobbyists for trademark bureaus that 
wanted to sell state trademark registration services.64 
Work on the federal trademark legislation that would become the 
Lanham Act began in the latter part of 1937, approximately six months 
before the decision in Erie was rendered. As the story goes, Congressman 
Fritz Lanham asked noted intellectual property practitioner and author, 
Edward S. Rogers, to share a draft of trademark legislation he prepared in 
conjunction with his work with the American Bar Association, Patent 
62. See Note, Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival of Federal Common Law, 59
HARV. L. REV. 966 (1946), as reprinted in 13 CURRENT LEGAL THOUGHT 193, 194–201 (1946) 
(describing cases where the Erie doctrine was not applied). 
63. Trade-Mark Act of 1946, Pub.L. No. 79–489, 60 Stat. 427 (enacted July 5, 1946). 
64. See Sondra Levine, The Origins of the Lanham Act, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 22, 25–
26 (2004); Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW & 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 173, 177 (1949); Kenneth Perry, State Trade-Mark Legislation, 37 
TRADEMARK REP. 283 (1947). 
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Section, on earlier legislation known as the Vestal Bill.65 That began a 
nine-year process to adopt the Lanham Act. Throughout this period until 
his death in 1949, Edward Rogers was not content to limit his advocacy 
to trademark law; he was also a passionate advocate for an expansive view 
of unfair competition law and the need for a federal law on the subject.66 
For instance, in 1940, he published an article titled “New Directions in the 
Law of Unfair Competition” wherein he discussed what he labeled as the 
wrongs of misrepresentation and misappropriation.67 Then, in 1945, he 
wrote an article in which he lamented the gaps in the state law of unfair 
competition and suggested legislation based upon the language of the 
Paris Convention as amended at London in 1934 to include Article 10bis, 
among other provisions.68 
Between Edward Rogers’s original call for a more expansive federal 
unfair competition law in 1945, and the introduction of proposed 
legislation in 1959 (as described infra), arguments were made 
encouraging federal courts to take an expansive view of the Lanham Act. 
The focus of these arguments was on § 44(h) of the Lanham Act which 
many argued allowed all nature of unfair competition claims affecting 
interstate commerce to be brought in federal court.69 Section 44(h) of the 
Lanham Act, adopted to comply with Article 10bis, reads: 
(h) Any person designated in paragraph (b) of this section as entitled to 
the benefits and subject to the provisions of this Act shall be entitled to 
effective protection against unfair competition, and the remedies 
provided herein for infringement of marks shall be available so far as 
they may be appropriate in repressing acts of unfair competition.70 
65. Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW & 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 173, 177 (1949).  
66. Edward Rogers’ advocacy with respect to the Lanham Act, and unfair competition law
more generally, are detailed in volume 62 of the Trademark Law Reporter, the “Edward S. Rogers 
Memorial Edition,” 62 TRADEMARK REP. 175 (1972).  
67. Edward S. Rogers, New Directions in the Law of Unfair Competition, 74 N.Y. L. REV. 317 
(1940). 
68. Edward S. Rogers, Unfair Competition, 35 TRADEMARK REP. 126, 131 (1945). In pertinent 
part, Article 10bis of the Paris Convention states: “(1) The countries of the Union are bound to assure 
to nationals of such countries effective protection against unfair competition. (2) Any act of 
competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters constitutes an act of 
unfair competition.” 
69. See Note, Trade-Marks, Unfair Competition, and the Courts: Some Unsettled Aspects of
the Lanham Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1094, 1101–02 (1953); Julius R. Lunsford, Jr., Unfair 
Competition: Uniform State Act Needed, 44 VA. L. REV. 583 (1958), as reprinted in 40 PAT. J. OFF. 
SOC’Y 644 (1958) (describing the arguments and the state of the unfair competition law twenty years 
after Erie).   
70. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1126(h) (West 2002) (emphasis added). 
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Pursuant to the Stauffer doctrine, the expansive view of the Lanham Act 
was accepted for a time in the Ninth Circuit,71 but as more decisional law 
under the Lanham Act developed, the jurisdictional scope of the Lanham 
Act became more confused and limited and, ultimately, the arguments for 
a broad interpretation of § 44(h) did not prevail.72 
Heeding the original call of Edward Rogers, the Association of the 
Bar of the City of New York began to advocate for the adoption of a 
federal law to govern unfair competition.73 Designed to take advantage of 
the recently developed Lincoln Mills doctrine, which noted the power of 
federal courts to develop a body of federal common law with respect to 
federal labor statutes, the general goal of a federal unfair competition law 
was “to permit the federal courts to resume the fashioning of a uniform 
and dynamic body of national unfair competition law without compelling 
recourse to variegated or inadequate state precedents, i.e., ‘checker-board 
law.’”74 
Beginning with the start of the two-year legislative session in 1959, 
Congressman John Lindsay biennially introduced legislation to enact a 
federal law of unfair competition that would supplement the earlier 
adopted Lanham Act.75 As set forth in the 1963 version of the bill, the 
proposed law would allow “any person damaged or likely to be damaged 
by unfair commercial activities in or affecting commerce” to bring a civil 
71. Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1950). 
72. Julius R. Lunsford, Jr., Unfair Competition: Uniform State Act Needed, 44 VA. L. REV. 
583 (1958), as reprinted in 40 PAT. J. OFF. SOC’Y 644 (1958) (discussing the development and demise 
of the Stauffer doctrine). 
73. Peterson, supra note 35; see also Louis Kunin, The Lindsay Bill Before and After the Stiffel 
Case, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 731, 736–37 (1964). 
From Mr. Rogers’ first draft, after several years of work commenced by the Committee 
on Trademarks and Unfair Competition of the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York, there has now evolved the Lindsay Bill. First introduced in the House in 1959, it 
was widely circulated among professional groups and other interested parties. A revised 
version was re-introduced in 1961. After further circulation and comment the Bill was 
revised again and offered in 1962. Once again, after thorough review by interested groups, 
additional amendments were made before a current version of the Bill was introduced in 
both the House and Senate in 1963. 
Sidney A. Diamond, The Proposed Federal Unfair Commercial Activities Act, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 110 
(1962), reprinted in 52 TRADEMARK REP. 104 (1962). 
74. Kunin, supra note 73, at 732–33 (citing the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. 448); see also Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of 
Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) (holding that the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 not only 
gave federal courts jurisdiction in labor disputes, but enabled federal courts to “fashion a body of 
federal law” to govern such disputes). 
75. See H.R. 7833, 86th Cong. (1st Sess. 1959); H.R. 10038, 87th Cong. (2d Sess. 1962); S.
1036, 87th Cong. (1st Sess. 1961); S. 2784, 87th Cong. (2d Sess. 1962); S. 1038, 88th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 1963). 
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action in federal court to obtain injunctive relief, costs, and reasonable 
attorney fees.76 Unfair commercial activities were defined to include “the 
commission for purposes of profit of any . . . act or practice which . . . 
violates reasonable standards of commercial ethics.”77 In order to 
overcome the reluctance of common law courts to grant relief in cases 
where there was no direct competition and no proof of actual damages, 
the legislation further provided that injunctive relief could be granted 
despite the “absence of competition between the parties or actual damage 
to the person seeking protection.”78 
The Lindsay Bill received its first and apparently only formal hearing 
in June of 1964.79 Congressman Lindsay explained: “The basic purpose 
of the bill is to create a Federal statutory cause of action that could be 
invoked by an injured party as an alternative to the common law tort of 
unfair competition in cases where interstate commerce is affected.”80 In 
his testimony supporting the legislation, W.G. Reynolds, then President 
of the United States Trademark Association, noted the legislation would 
fulfill three needs: 
(a) a sore need to fill-in missing gaps in existing remedies against unfair 
commercial activities; (b) a need for modernizing these remedies to cope 
with drastic changes that have been going on all about us in the field of 
interstate commerce, and (c) a need for encouragement to reputable 
businessmen who are bewildered and puzzled by the failure of the 
present law to provide relief commensurate with the shifting wrongs 
which they are encountering in their day to day business activities.81 
Despite over six years of effort, the Lanham Act was never amended as 
proposed, effectively limiting the scope of the Lanham Act to the wrongs 
that are defined in § 32 with respect to registered marks and § 43 with 
respect to unregistered marks.82 
76. H.R. 4651 and S. 1038, 88th Cong. (1st Sess. 1963). 
77. Id. at § 3(d). 
78. Id. at § 4. 
79. Walter J. Derenberg, The Seventeenth Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark
Act of 1946, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 655, 656–57 (1964) (noting first hearing on Lindsay Bill and 
opposition thereto from the Attorney General’s Office and the Federal Trade Commission). 
80. Hearing on H.R. 4651 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce & Finance of the H. Comm.
on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong. 9 (1964) (statement of Rep. Lindsay). 
81. Statement of W.G. Reynolds in Support of Unfair Activities Bill, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 785, 
785 (1964). 
82. Trade Mark Act, Pub. L. 489, 79th Cong. (July 5, 1946). As originally adopted, section
43(a) of the Lanham Act provided that:  
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or 
services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any 
false description or representation, including words of other symbols tending falsely to 
17
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The need for a federal law to govern unfair competition became more 
urgent in 1964 as a result of the Erie/Sears/Compco squeeze. In the 
companion cases of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. and Compco Corp. 
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., decided on the same date in March 1964, the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Illinois unfair competition law prohibiting 
product simulation was preempted by federal patent law.83 This created a 
dilemma for business interests concerned about the development of unfair 
competition law in the United States, particularly since Illinois was one 
of the first and foremost states to recognize that, in the absence of a statute, 
unfair competition law was to be governed by state common law.84 
Having learned from Erie that the federal judiciary had a limited role in 
the development of common law, the practicing bar was shocked to learn 
that the very entities that were charged with developing unfair competition 
law—state courts and legislatures—were prevented by principles of 
federal preemption from adopting state laws that interfered with federal 
patent policies.85 
John Peterson, then Chairman of the Unfair Competition Committee 
of the American Patent Law Association (now the American Intellectual 
Property Law Association), expressed the concerns of the practicing bar: 
The sweeping language of the Court in Sears and Compco has made it 
uncertain how these decisions are to be applied in subsequent cases 
presenting differing factual situations, and whether they are to be limited 
describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into 
commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of 
origin or description or representation cause or procure the same to be transported or used 
in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to 
a civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin 
or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is 
or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation. 
Id. Section 43 of the Lanham Act was subsequently amended seven times since 1988, first in a manner 
that more clearly specified the wrongs of false advertising and trade disparagement in section 43(a) 
(15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), and later to include the wrongs of trademark dilution (15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)) 
and cyber-squatting (15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)). See Pub. L. 100-667, Title I, § 132, 102 Stat. 3946  (Nov. 
16, 1988); Pub. L. 102-542, § 3(c), 106 Stat. 3568 (Oct. 27, 1992); Pub. L. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 
985 (Jan. 16, 1996); Pub. L. 106-43, §§ 3(a)(2), 5, 113 Stat. 219, 220 (Aug. 5, 1999); Pub. L. 106-
113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-545 (Nov. 29, 1999); Pub. L. 109-312, § 2, 120 
Stat. 1730 (Oct. 6, 2006); Pub. L. 112-190, § 1(a), 126 Stat. 1436 (Oct. 5, 2012). 
83. See generally Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964); Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964). 
84. See Baird, supra note 23, at 425–27. 
85. See Ciro A. Gamboni, Unfair Competition Protection after Sears and Compco, 55
TRADEMARK REP. 964, 969–70 (1965). 
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to cases of product simulation or are to be extended to the whole field 
of unfair competition.86 
The practicing bar was so concerned about the impact of the Sears and 
Compco decisions that the United States Trademark Association (now the 
International Trademark Association or INTA) regularly reported on 
developments in the area of state unfair competition in a section of an 
annual review of the Lanham Act labeled “Unfair Competition and the 
Sears-Compco Doctrine,” lauding any decision that appeared to limit 
application of the Sears/Compco doctrine.87 
An obvious solution to the Erie/Sears/Compco squeeze was the 
enactment of federal legislation along the lines of the Lindsay Bill. 
However, concerned members of the bar were not content to leave a 
solution up to Congress, particularly because the Lindsay Bill had not 
progressed much in five years.88 Apparently, the critical difficulty in 
enacting such a law revolved around the definition of unfair competition. 
As previously noted, some proponents of a federal law of unfair 
competition favored broad, general language that might prohibit still 
unknown forms of unfair competition.89 Others were fearful of an open-
ended definition and advocated for the specification of actionable 
wrongful acts.90 Thus, in addition to federal legislation, various other 
strategies were pursued including: arguments made in a variety of cases 
to limit the effects of the Erie, Sears, and Compco decisions; proposed 
amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act; and the adoption of a 
state Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.91 Proposals were also made 
86. Peterson, supra note 35, at 28. 
87. See, e.g., H. Bowen Wands, Priority: Lanham Act or Model State Trademark Bill?, 58
TRADEMARK REP. 801 (1968); Walter J. Derenberg, The Twenty-Fifth Year of Administration of the 
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 62 TRADEMARK REP. 393, 499 (Aug. 1972); Walter J. Derenberg, 
The Twenty-Fourth Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 61 TRADEMARK 
REP. 257, 322 (July 1971); Walter J. Derenberg, The Twenty-Third Year of Administration of the 
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 60 TRADEMARK REP. 387, 462 (Aug. 1970); Walter J. Derenberg, 
The Twenty-Second Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 59 TRADEMARK 
REP. 625, 712 (Aug. 1969); Kenneth B. Germain, The Thirty-Fourth Year of Administration of the 
Lanham Act of 1946, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 285, 495 (July–Aug. 1981); Peterson, supra note 35, at 
776; Brief in Support of Congressional Passage, supra note 38, at 735. 
88. Peterson, supra note 35, at 45 (“This Bill, representing the distillation of years of hard and 
painstaking effort, has produced reactions ranging from enthusiastic support to bitter 
denunciation. . . . [I]t has been attacked for its vagueness, for its failure to give definition to the term 
‘unfair commercial activity,’ and for extending the law beyond the bounds of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act.”). 
89. Supra notes 67–76. 
90. Infra notes 99-104. 
91. Peterson, supra note 35, at 28–48; see also Peterson, supra note 35, at 55, n.181 (giving a 
history of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act); supra note 66 (providing citations for the 
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for the adoption of federal legislation to make it clear that patent law was 
not intended to preempt state trade secret law.92  
The practicing bar’s interest in solving the Erie/Sears/Compco 
squeeze was so great that a National Coordinating Committee consisting 
of over 36 professional associations was formed in order to find a 
solution.93 Members of this committee included the American Patent Law 
Association, the United States Trademark Association, and the PTC 
Section of the American Bar Association.94 As detailed in the 1966 Report 
of Committee 402, the PTC was frequently asked to consider what it 
referred to as the perennial Lindsay Bill.95 In 1962, a resolution favoring 
the legislation was defeated by a margin of 75 to 66.96 In 1963 and 1964, 
however, resolutions favoring the bill were passed.97 Two reasons were 
given for support of the Lindsay Bill: the need to replace variegated state 
precedents resulting from Erie and the need to resolve the federal-state 
conflict noted in the Sears and Compco cases.98 
When the Lindsay Bill stalled in Congress, its supporters proposed 
to effectuate its purposes by amending the Lanham Act.99 There followed 
additional efforts by members of the PTC and the National 
Coordinating Committee to fashion legislation that would be acceptable 
to both the practicing bar and members of Congress.100 Known as the 
McClellan Bill, after the Senator who introduced it and denominated the 
Unfair Competition and the Sears-Compco Doctrine section in the Trademark Rep., which cites cases 
relevant to this discussion). 
92. Roger M. Milgrim, Trade Secrets, Interference with Contracts, and Related Matters, 1974 
A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 252–53 [hereinafter 
Trade Secrets 1974] (detailing resolutions to this effect since 1969); Richard F. Dole, Jr., Trade 
Secrets, Interference with Contracts, and Related Matters, 1973 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & 
COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 173–74 [hereinafter Trade Secrets 1973]. 
93. Brief in Support of Congressional Passage, supra note 38, at 89–90, n.5. 
94. Brief in Support of Congressional Passage, supra note 38, at 89–90, n.5–n.6. 
95. Dayton R. Stemple, Jr., Unfair Competition, 1966 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & 
COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 126  [hereinafter Unfair Competition 1966]; cf. Boynton 
P. Livingston, Unfair Competition, 1963 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. 
COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 164 [hereinafter Unfair Competition 1963] (demonstrating that at the time 
of the drafting of the UTSA, Committee 402 was the committee charged with considering issues 
related to the law of unfair competition, including “state and federal laws relating to trade secrets,” 
“problems arising out of violations of trade secrets and inducement of breach of contract,” and “other 
possible forms of unfair competition”). 
96. Unfair Competition 1966, supra note 93, at 126. 
97. Unfair Competition 1966, supra note 93, at 126. 
98. Louis Kunin, Unfair Competition, 1964 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L.
COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 108-09. 
99. Tom Arnold, A Federal Unfair Competition Law, McClellan S. 3681, 89th Cong., 57
TRADEMARK REP. 116, 117 (1967). 
100.  Unfair Competition 1966, supra note 93, at 127–28. 
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Unfair Competition Act of 1966, this legislation differed from the Lindsay 
Bill in a number of respects.101 Most notably, rather than establishing a 
separate federal law of unfair competition, it proposed various 
amendments to § 43 of the Lanham Act.102 Among its proposed provisions 
was new § 43(a)(4), which would have imposed civil liability on any 
person who engaged “in any act, trade practice, or course of conduct” that 
“results or is likely to result in the wrongful disclosure or 
misappropriation of a trade secret or other research or development or 
commercial information maintained in confidence by another[.]”103 
As described in a brief in support of the McClellan Bill, the 
legislation was needed to: (1) fill the gaps in the common law of unfair 
competition that were left by Erie; (2) resolve conflicting state rulings and 
approaches; (3) eliminate the conflict of laws problem resulting from 
increased interstate commerce; (4) foster greater uniformity; (5) provide 
a framework for the development of a federal common law of unfair 
competition; and (6) provide for remedies consistent with those provided 
under the patent and copyright statutes.104 In other words, like the UTSA 
that followed it, the McClellan Bill was not designed simply to codify 
existing principles of unfair competition law; it was designed to alter those 
principles in several respects. 
Debate about the proposed Unfair Competition Act of 1966 included 
whether the Act should include a broad catch-all provision or be limited 
to a specific list of actionable wrongs.105 A compromise was struck to 
include specific examples of unfair competition followed by a generic 
definition of unfair competition that (consistent with the language of 
Article 10bis of the Paris Convention) prohibited any act that “is 
otherwise contrary to commercial good faith or to normal and honest 
practices of the business or activity in which he is engaged[.]”106 With 
101.  Brief in Support of Congressional Passage, supra note 38, at 91. 
102.  See S. 3681, 89th Cong. (1967); S. 1154, 90th Cong. (1968). 
103.  See id.  
104.  Brief in Support of Congressional Passage, supra note 38, at 88–89. 
105.  Unfair Competition 1966, supra note 93, at 128 (“The generic approach of the Lindsay bill 
and the proposed amendment to the Lanham Act appears to be favored now by a large majority”). 
 106.  Unfair Competition 1966, supra note 93, at 130; see also Brief in Support of Congressional 
Passage, supra note 38, at 104; cf. Sharon K. Sandeen, The Limits of Trade Secret Law: The Story of 
Article 39 of TRIPS and the Limited Scope of Trade Secret Protection in the United States, in THE 
LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Rochelle 
Dreyfuss & Katherine Strandburg, eds., 2011) (explaining that a similar compromise was reached in 
the drafting of Article 39 of the World Trade Organization, Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (the TRIPS Agreement), following the United States’s proposal to add trade 
secret misappropriation to the list of acts of unfair competition specifically recognized by the 
international community). 
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respect to the proposed trade secret provision, an issue arose about how to 
draft the language so it would cover information that was not absolutely 
secret; in other words, information that is only relatively secret because it 
is disclosed to another in the course of a confidential relationship.107  
C. The Uniform State Law Era 
At the same time federal legislation was being pursued, members of 
the practicing bar also undertook efforts to fill gaps in state unfair 
competition law through, among other means, the adoption of uniform 
state laws, including the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act 
(UDTPA).108 As described in minutes of a meeting of the Unfair 
Competition Committee of NCCUSL, efforts to adopt what would 
become the UDTPA began in 1958 when the PTC section of the ABA 
requested that NCCUSL “study and draft a uniform state law on unfair 
competition.”109 Although it was recognized that there were several forms 
of unfair competition, it was determined that the law of unfair competition 
should be divided into the following two general areas for purposes of the 
adoption of uniform laws: “An Act dealing with false, confusing or 
deceptive trade identification and false, confusing or deceptive 
 107.  Brief in Support of Congressional Passage, supra note 38, at 101 (“A problem area stems 
from the fact that most alleged secrets are secrets only in a qualified sense: secret for one purpose but 
not for another, secret from one person or group of persons but not from another.”). 
 108.  National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Revised Uniform 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (1966); cf. Kunin, supra note 71, at 734–35 (demonstrating that other 
strategies and theories for resurrecting a federal body of unfair competition law were attempted 
without success); e.g. Kunin, supra note 71, at 735, n.42 (citing Nat’l Fruit Prods. Co. v. Dwinnel-
Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass. 1942)) (explaining that beginning in 1942, there was a series 
of cases in which plaintiffs argued that § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act created a private 
right of action that would allow individuals and businesses to bring a suit in federal court.); Kunin, 
supra note 71, at 735, n.39 (citing Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1950)) (demonstrating 
that in 1950, the Ninth Circuit took the position that §§ 44(b), (h), and (i) of the Lanham Act conferred 
federal jurisdiction over unfair competition claims); Kunin, supra note 71, at 733–34, n.26 
(citing Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Labs., 269 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1959)) (stating that there 
was a series of cases, beginning with Kemart Corp., in which it was contended that the unfair 
competition provisions of the Paris Convention and the Inter-American Convention were self-
executing and, therefore, the “supreme law of the land” under the U.S. Constitution and that, as a 
result, federal courts were authorized to develop a federal body of unfair competition law); Kunin, 
supra note 71, at 375, n.43 (citing L’Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. LanaLobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 
1954)) (arguing that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act should be interpreted to cover ordinary cases of 
passing off and product simulation). 
 109.  National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Proceedings of the 
Committee of the Whole Uniform Trade Practices Act, at 1-2 (August 4, 1962).  
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representations as to the source or origin of goods; [and] an Act dealing 
with trade secrets and confidential disclosures.”110 
Thus, the UDTPA does not contain a trade secret provision. Nor does 
it specifically address other behaviors that the common law of state and 
federal courts, pre-Erie, deemed unfair, like those described in INS. 
Instead, it focuses on the behaviors that are also covered by § 43 of the 
Lanham Act; An obvious goal being to provide a possible state claim for 
relief where the interstate commerce requirements of the Lanham Act 
could not be met. 
Professor Richard Dole, who also was actively involved in the 
promulgation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (discussed infra), was 
involved in drafting the UDTPA. In his 1964 article on the topic, he 
described the state of unfair competition law that precipitated the 
enactment of the UDTPA: 
Deceptive conduct constituting unreasonable interference with 
another’s promotion and conduct of business is part of a heterogeneous 
collection of legal wrongs known as “unfair trade practices.” This type 
of conduct is notoriously undefined. Commonly referred to as “unfair 
competition,” its metes and bounds have not been charted.111 
Ultimately adopted by NCCUSL at its August 1964 meeting and 
subsequently adopted by 11 states,112 the UDTPA was designed “to bring 
state law up to date by removing undue restrictions on the common-law 
action of deceptive trade practices.”113 
Although the UDTPA singled out certain objectionable practices 
(namely, misleading trade identification and false or deceptive 
advertising), it was intended to leave courts “free to fix the proper ambit 
of the Act in case-by-case adjudications.”114 As explained in the Prefatory 
Note to the UDTPA: 
In 1958 the Section of Patents, Trademark and Copyright Law of the 
American Bar Association passed a resolution which stated that “there 
should be uniformity in the law of unfair competition among the 
respective states.” . . . Since the provisions of the Lindsey Bill and of the 
 110.  Id.; see also, Letter from Frances D. Jones, Executive Secretary of NCCUSL, to G.M. 
Fuller, Esq. (December 7, 1966). 
 111.  Richard F. Dole, Jr., Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act: A Prefatory Note, 54 
TRADEMARK REP. 435, 435 (1964).  
 112.  Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Oklahoma, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
New Mexico, and Ohio. Other states have unfair competition statutes, but they did not adopt the 
UDTPA. See e.g., Calif. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200-17209.   
113.  Dole, Jr., supra note 111, at 436. 
114.  Dole, Jr., supra note 111, at 436. 
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Uniform Act are sufficiently similar, the main question is the route by 
which uniformity is obtained–voluntary adoption by the state 
legislatures or by a federal act imposing a particular rule on the states. 
The Uniform Act is designed to bring state law up to date by removing 
undue restrictions on the common law action for deceptive trade 
practices. Certain objectionable practices are singled out, but courts are 
left free to fix the proper ambit of the act in case by case adjudication.115 
Thus, in the same way that the Lindsay legislation was designed both to 
fill the vacuum in unfair competition law that was left by Erie and provide 
more uniformity, certainty, and clarity in the law of unfair competition, 
the UDTPA was designed to supplement and change a body of common 
law that was thought to be deficient. 
Although nothing happened at NCCUSL with respect to a uniform 
trade secrets act between 1958 and late 1968, in 1966 the PTC decided to 
consider the need for a uniform trade secret law.116 While Committee 402 
of the PTC convened to consider the advisability of a federal unfair 
competition law that included provisions regarding trade secrets, 
Committee 107, Protection of Confidential Rights and Know-How, was 
considering related questions.117 The principal concern of Committee 107 
was that the scope of trade secret protection varied from state to state, 
particularly with respect to the treatment of departing 
employees.118 Concern was also expressed that the proposed amendments 
to the Lanham Act would not eliminate the need for state law and that 
inconsistency in the laws of various states was leading to forum 
shopping.119 In 1968, a resolution favoring the adoption of a uniform trade 
secrets act was approved by the PTC and, consistent with a long-
standing relationship between the ABA and NCCUSL, the matter was 
 115.  National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Revised Uniform 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (1966). 
 116.  James M. Heilman, Protection of Confidential Rights and Know-How, 1967 A.B.A. SEC. 
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 107, at 59 [hereinafter Protection of 
Confidential Rights 1967]; Robert E. Isner, Trade Secrets, Interference with Contracts and Related 
Matters, 1967 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 140. 
 117.  G. Franklin Rothwell, Protection of Confidential Rights and Know-How, 1966 A.B.A. SEC. 
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 107, at 63. 
118.  See Protection of Confidential Rights 1967, supra note 116, at 59–61. 
 119.  Leonard B. Mackey, Protection of Confidential Rights and Know-How, 1968 A.B.A. SEC. 
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 107, at 68 (“Recent proliferation of various 
state statutes, each taking a slightly different tack than the others, may create a pattern of legislation 
resulting in the situs determining the protection to be afforded the owner of a trade secret. This is 
undesirable. It is deemed highly desirable that the problem be approached through the enactment of a 
uniform act by states in addition to any amendment of Federal statutes.”). 
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referred to NCCUSL for further handling.120 The 1968 resolution by the 
PTC supporting a uniform trade secrets act, together with expressions of 
support from other interested parties, provided the impetus for a trade 
secret project.121 
The resurrected uniform trade secrets act project began with the 
formation within NCCUSL of a Special Committee on Uniform Trade 
Secrets Protection Act (hereinafter the Special Committee) chaired by 
Commissioner Joseph McKeown and the preparation of a report by 
Professor Richard Dole on the current state of trade secret law.122 In 
August 1972 at the Annual Meeting of NCCUSL held in San Francisco, 
the proposed UTSA received its first reading.123 According to a verbatim 
transcript of the first reading, the focus of the NCCUSL Commissioners’ 
early discussions was on four broad policy questions.124 But the question 
was also raised whether a uniform law was needed at all. As a NCCUSL 
Commissioner explained: “Any time I approach a proposal for legislation, 
my first question is: Which is better in this area, the common law process 
or legislation?”125 The answer to this question helps explain not only the 
purpose of the UTSA, but also its meaning and import. Professor Dole 
responded that he thought the UTSA could resolve a number of abuses 
that were occurring under the common law, and what he referred to as the 
 120.  Edward C. Vandenburgh, Resolution 14, 1968 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & 
COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 95 at 68; cf. Relationship between American Bar Association and 
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (explaining that the NCCUSL was 
created in 1892 upon the recommendation of the ABA); Instructions for ABA Advisors to Drafting 
Committees of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (February 1, 1979) 
(demonstrating that the by-laws of NCCUSL specifically require that it notify and consult with the 
appropriate committee or section of the ABA); NCCUSL Drafting Committee Status Report (1978–
1979) (demonstrating that at the time of the adoption of the UTSA in 1979, Edward T. McCabe was 
the ABA liaison to the NCCUSL Drafting Committee on Uniform Trade Secrets). 
 121.  See, e.g., Letter from the American Chemical Society to Allison Dunham of NCCUSL 
(April 13, 1969). 
 122.  Letter from Allison Dunham, Executive Director of NCCUSL, to Albert F. James, Jr. (July 
30, 1969) (“Professor Richard Dole of the University of Iowa prepared a study report for this 
committee which has just been circulated to the chairman of the committee. . . . The reporter, Richard 
Dole, has just been made a Commissioner from Iowa which may present some awkwardness in his 
being reporter for another Commissioner.”). 
 123.  National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, Proceedings of the 
Committee of the Whole Uniform Trade Secrets Protection Act, (August 4–11, 1972) [hereinafter 
1972 Proceedings on Uniform Trade Secrets]. 
124.  Id. at 8-24. 
 125.  Id. at 31, comments of Commissioner Keeton. See also Trade Secrets 1973, Subcomm. C 
Report, supra note 92, at 179 (posing the question “whether it might be preferable to rely on common 
law rather than upon a statutory solution in cases involving misappropriation”). 
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preemption problem—the preemption problem referring to Sears, 
Compco, and their progeny.126 
Following the first reading of the proposed UTSA in August of 1972, 
work on the project continued both at NCCUSL and the ABA.127 With the 
decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Kewanee Oil Co. v. 
Bicron Corp.128 in May 1973, however, the entire project was put on hold 
due to doubts about the ability of states to legislate in the area of trade 
secret law.129 The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kewanee was the third in a 
series of post-Sears/Compco cases that created doubt about the continued 
viability of claims for trade secret misappropriation based upon state 
law.130 The first was the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1969 decision in Lear, Inc. 
v. Adkins, in which the Court overturned the well-established doctrine of
licensee estoppel and held that patent licensees could challenge the 
validity of patents that were the subject of their licenses.131 The second 
was the decision in Painton & Company, Ltd. v. Bourns, Inc., in which 
the district court refused to enforce the trade secret provisions of a 
manufacturing agreement, finding a conflict with patent policy.132 When 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the district court’s decision 
in Painton in 1971, the practicing bar breathed a sigh of relief.133 For over 
two years thereafter, it was assumed that trade secret law could co-exist 
with patent law. That assumption changed when the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals rendered its decision in Kewanee.134 
With the conflicting decisions and reasoning of the circuit courts 
in Kewanee and Painton, circumstances were ripe for the U.S. Supreme 
Court to decide whether state trade secret law was preempted by federal 
 126.  Id. at 32-33; see also supra Part III.B (explaining that the “pre-emption problem” refers to 
the implications of the Sears/Compco decisions on state trade secret law). 
 127.  Letter to William H. Adams, III from Joseph McKeown (April 13, 1973); Trade Secrets 
1973, Subcomm. C Report, supra note 90, at 179; Letter to Special Committee Members from Joseph 
McKeown (July 5, 1973). 
128.  478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973). 
 129.  Trade Secrets 1973, Subcomm. C Report, supra note 90, at 180 (“The future of our efforts 
and those of the National Conference with respect to the promulgation and adoption of the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act will remain in doubt unless and until the Congress enacts legislation negating any 
federal intent to preempt state causes of action for unfair competition.”). See also Trade Secrets 1974, 
supra note 92, at 254 (noting that no activity was taken with respect to the UTSA pending the outcome 
of the Kewanee case). 
130.  See Roger M. Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton: Of Whales and Other Matter, 46 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 17, 25–32 (1971); Joseph P. Zammit, The Ghost of Sears-Compco Is Finally Laid to Rest (Or 
is It?), 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37, 37–40 (1975). 
131.  395 U.S. 653 (1969). 
132.  309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
133.  442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971). 
134.  478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973). 
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patent law. The Court’s 1974 decision that Ohio’s common law of trade 
secrecy was not preempted by U.S. patent law solved the preemption 
problem in part, allowing efforts to craft a uniform trade secrets act to 
resume in late 1975.135 The UTSA was finally approved by NCCUSL at 
its annual meeting in August 1979, over forty-years after 
Erie.136 However, despite the fact that trade secret claims based upon state 
law (at least as defined by the Supreme Court in Kewanee) were not 
preempted by U.S. patent law, the possibility of federal preemption of 
state unfair competition law remains as a constraint on the ability of states 
to regulate in the area of unfair competition, as does the language of the 
UTSA itself.137 
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF U.S. UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW
As a result of the foregoing history, unfair competition law in the 
United States is an amalgamation of federal and state statutes, 
international law, and state and federal common law. But it is a body of 
law that is limited in scope due to the principle of free competition that 
undergirds U.S. law138 and the principles of federal preemption that are 
expressed in Sears, Compco, Kewanee, and § 301 of the 1976 Copyright 
Act.139 Thus, while Erie seemingly required the development of a robust 
body of state common law to govern unfair competition, that law never 
materialized. Moreover, the broad and amorphous definition of unfair 
competition urged by Edward Rogers, Richard Dole, and others has not 
been adopted as federal law—except to the extent it is encompassed in the 
Federal Trade Commission’s application of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act of 1914 (discussed infra).140 
135.  416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
 136.  National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, Proceedings of the 
Committee of the Whole Uniform Trade Secrets Act (August 6–7, 1979). 
137.  See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); 17 U.S.C. §301 
(2012); see also Uniform Trade Secrets Act, § 7 (1979). 
138.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 38 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
 139.  See Guy A. Rub, A Less-Formalistic Copyright Preemption, 24 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 327 
(2017) (discussing the scope of copyright preemption); Sharon K. Sandeen, Kewanee Revisited: 
Returning to First Principles of Intellectual Property Law to Determine the Issue of Federal 
Preemption, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 299, 301 (2008) (discussing the scope of patent 
preemption as applied to trade secret law); Edmund J. Sease, Misappropriation Is Seventy-Five Years 
Old; Should We Bury It or Revive It?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 781, 807–808 (1994) (describing how 
principles of federal preemption restrain the INS misappropriation doctrine); Federal Preemption of 
State Unfair Competition Laws., 78 HARV. L. REV. 177, 309 (1964) (discussing the Sears/Compco 
cases).  
140.  Some states have adopted such a definition, notably California which adopted Business 
and Professions Code §17200 in 1941. 
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In 1995, following most of the major developments in U.S. unfair 
competition law post-Erie, the American Law Institute (ALI) issued a 
separate volume on unfair competition law, divorcing it from the 
Restatement of Torts where it previously resided. Although lengthy, 
consisting of over 600 pages with case citations, it illustrates the limited 
scope of the modern law of unfair competition in the United States as it 
covers only four topics: (1) the freedom to compete; (2) deceptive 
marketing; (3) the law of trademarks; and (4) appropriation of trade 
values. It also demonstrates how much this law is based upon statutes as 
opposed to state common law. As explained in the Forward to the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition: 
Federal and state statutes play a significant, sometimes dominant role in 
many of the substantive areas encompassed within this Restatement. For 
the most part the federal legislation does not preempt state law, and both 
federal and state unfair competition statutes generally rely without 
significant elaboration on concepts derived from the common law. The 
interstate character of modern business accentuates the interest in 
uniformity—an interest advanced by a consistent interpretation of both 
the common law rules and derivative statutory provisions that define the 
boundaries of fair competition. Except as otherwise noted, the principles 
discussed in this Restatement are applicable to actions at common law 
and to the interpretation of analogous federal and state statutory 
codifications.141 
The relevant federal laws include the Lanham Act, § 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act,142 and the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016.143 
There are also a variety of other federal laws and regulations that regulate 
the behaviors of competitors in certain circumstances, including antitrust 
laws and U.S. patent and copyright law.144 At the state level, the principal 
laws governing unfair competition are the Uniform Trade Secret Act (now 
adopted by 48 of 50 states and all U.S. Territories)145 and the Uniform 
Deceptive Practices Act or similar statutes, often referred to as little FTC 
141.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, Forward (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
142.  15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
143.  See, respectively: 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2017); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011). 
144.  See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Ex Parte Young and the Transformation of the Federal Courts, 
1890–1917, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 931, 939 (2009) (“[T]he common-law language of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act . . . effectively delegated to the federal courts a new authority for shaping national policy 
through the guise of statutory construction.”). 
 145.  See National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, Legislative Fact Sheet-
Trade Secrets Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION (2018), [http://www.uniformlaws.org/
LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act [https://perma.cc/H23N-XH8U]. 
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Acts.146 Many states have also adopted laws and regulations that regulate 
various behaviors and aspects of competition within specific industries.147 
Before Erie, there were federal trademark statutes and a rich body of 
federal jurisprudence governing registered trademarks, with unregistered 
trademarks being governed by state law or the federal general common 
law invalidated by Erie.148 In fact, as Mark McKenna has noted, both 
before and after Erie, it was the federal courts, rather than Congress or 
state courts and legislatures, that developed most of trademark law’s 
substantive rules.149 Since Erie, unfair competition law in the form of the 
federal, state, and common law of trademarks has continued to evolve and 
has expanded greatly despite the fact that § 44(h) of the Lanham Act was 
not interpreted as broadly as some would have liked.150 This is primarily 
the result of an expansive view of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act that started 
to take root in the late 1960s151 and subsequent amendments to § 43 that 
expanded the types of wrongs that are actionable under the Lanham 
Act.152 
A critical change from pre-Erie law to post-Erie law that was 
included in the Lanham Act was the extension of federal trademark law 
to unregistered marks that are used in interstate commerce153 and the 
expansion of federal trademark law as a result of amendments to the 
Lanham Act. Now, in addition to trademark infringement, false 
advertising, and trade disparagement as defined by § 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act, the Lanham Act also prohibits trademark dilution and 
cybersquatting.154 Although state statutes and state common law continue 
to exist and evolve in parallel with federal law, because of the broad 
interpretation of interstate commerce under the Lanham Act, federal 
trademark law—including applicable federal common law—dominates 
trademark practice in the United States. 
According to the ALI, the appropriation of trade values referenced in 
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition refers to a number of 
 146.  See National Consumer Law Center, Consumer Protection in the States, STATE-BY-STATE 
SUMMARIES OF UDAP STATUTES, (January 10, 2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/
udap/analysis-state-summaries.pdf [https://perma.cc/C83Q-84HJ]. 
147.  Id. 
148.  Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64. (1938).  
149.  Mark McKenna, Trademark Law’s Faux Federalism, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
THE COMMON LAW 288, 288–310 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ed., 2013). 
150.  Id. 
 151.  Kenneth B. Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) Lanham Act: You’ve 
Come a Long Way, Baby, Too Far, Maybe?, 49 IND. L. J. 85 (1973). 
152.  Supra note 80. 
153.  Id. 
154.  15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). 
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possible civil claims, including: (1) trade secret misappropriation; (2)  the 
violation of rights of publicity in one’s identity; and (3) applicable federal 
and state statutes, breach of contract claims, and common law copyright 
claims.155 Specifically, § 38 of the Restatement of Unfair Competition 
states: 
One who causes harm to the commercial relations of another by 
appropriating the other’s intangible trade values is subject to liability to 
the other for such harm only if: 
a) the actor is subject to liability for an appropriation of the other’s 
trade secret under the rules stated in §§ 39-45; or
b) the actor is subject to liability for an appropriation of the
commercial value of the other’s identity under the rules stated
in §§ 46-49; or
c) the appropriation is actionable by the other under federal or
state statutes or international agreements, or is actionable as a
breach of contract, or as an infringement of common law
copyright as preserved under federal copyright law. (Emphasis
added.)
Of these categories, trade secret law is now largely governed by state and 
federal statutes with only New York still clinging to state common law.156 
Similarly, approximately half of the states have adopted rights of publicity 
statutes.157 With the adoption of the 1976 Copyright Act and subsequent 
amendments thereto—including the recent Music Modernization Act—
so-called common law copyrights are sparse.158 Thus, overall, the 
existence of federal and state statutes means that the common law of 
unfair competition now largely consists of state and federal decisional law 
interpreting the relevant statutes but with some narrowly tailored common 
law claims thrown in. 
Conspicuously absent from the text of § 38 of Restatement (Third) 
of Unfair Competition is the INS misappropriation doctrine and other 
common law theories of unfair competition. Rather, the comments to § 38 
note that the INS misappropriation doctrine has had little enduring 
155.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, Chapter 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
156.  Supra note 143. 
157.  See Jennifer E. Rothman, The Law, ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, 
https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/law [https://perma.cc/ZZX5-NQSQ] (online database of 
state rights of publicity law). 
 158.  See Zvi S. Rosen, Common-Law Copyright, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 1055 (2018) (detailing the 
scope of common law copyright before the adoption of the Music Modernization Act of 2018). 
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effect.159 This makes sense when one realizes that the INS 
misappropriation doctrine was effectively overruled by Erie, as it 
constituted federal general common law as opposed to federal common 
law.160 Additionally, although some states since Erie adopted the 
principles of INS as state law, such claims are often precluded or 
preempted.161 For instance, in many states that adopted the UTSA, 
common law causes of action related to the protection of information not 
qualifying as trade secrets are  precluded by § 7 of the UTSA which states: 
EFFECT ON OTHER LAW. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), 
this [Act] displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of this 
State providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret. (b) 
This [Act] does not affect: (1) contractual remedies, whether or not 
based upon misappropriation of a trade secret; (2) other civil remedies 
that are not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret; or (3) criminal 
remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade 
secret.162 
Although poorly drafted because it uses the term trade secret when it 
meant competitively significant information not qualifying for trade secret 
protection, § 7 of the UTSA has been interpreted to mean that all state tort 
claims based upon state common law or statutes related to the protection 
of information not qualifying as a trade secret are precluded by the 
UTSA.163 Moreover, depending upon the underlying facts and whether the 
information that is alleged to have been taken under a common law 
misappropriation theory is protected by copyright or falls into the scope 
of patentable subject matter, an INS claim may also be preempted by § 
301 of the U.S. Copyright Act or the principles annunciated in Sears, 
Compco, and Kewanee. 
The U.S. unfair competition law with the broadest potential scope is 
the Federal Trade Commission Act because it outlaws “unfair methods of 
159.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 38, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
 160.  Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 894 (2nd Cir. 2011) 
(“INS itself is no longer good law. Purporting to establish a principal of federal common law, the law 
established by INS was abolished by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, . . . which largely abandoned 
federal common law.”). 
161.  See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 851 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that 
most of the New York common law of unfair competition as recognized in Metro. Opera Ass’n v. 
Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff’d, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (App. 
Div. 1951) is preempted by section 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act). 
 162.  See UTSA, § 7, cmt. (“trade secrets” as used in Section 7 means “competitively significant 
information”). 
 163.  See BlueEarth Biofuels, LLC v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc., 123 Hawaii 214 (2010); but see 
Burbank Grease Services, LLC v. Sokolowski, 294 Wisc. 2d 274 (2006). 
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competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting 
commerce” and empowers the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to 
enforce the law.164 Section 5(n) of the FTC Act defines unlawful acts or 
practices as those that “cause[] or [are] likely to cause substantial injury to 
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves 
and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to 
competition.”165 Critical decisions over the past 100 years have defined 
the scope of the FTC’s power and its ability to determine what constitutes 
unfair or deceptive acts of practices in a manner that gives the FTC a lot 
of power to regulate unfair business practices.166 However, the FTC Act 
does not create a private right of action, meaning that the ability to create 
a federal common law of unfair competition that extends beyond the 
Lanham Act is necessarily limited by the cases that the FTC chooses to 
pursue.  
As detailed previously, another reaction to Erie concerned trade 
secret law, a branch of unfair competition law. Prior to Erie, trade secret 
law (as then defined) was highly reliant upon the common law of the 
states.167 Because of the promulgation of the UTSA in 1979, its adoption 
by all states except New York and North Carolina, and the 2016 enactment 
of the DTSA, U.S. trade secret law is now governed nearly exclusively by 
statutes.168 In contrast to trademark law, however, state common and 
decisional law is a significant underlying source of U.S. trade secret 
principles due to the different ways that the two bodies of law developed 
and the means by which gaps in trade secret and a trademark law were 
filled post-Erie.169 To put it simply, there was a larger body of state 
common law with respect to trade secret principles from which federal 
courts could draw post-Erie, and because most trade secret cases were 
filed in state court (at least before the enactment of the DTSA), that law 
continued to develop largely unabated. Also, whereas the scope of 
164.  Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. 79-489 (July 5, 1946); 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2012). 
165.  15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012). 
166.  Herbert Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 FLA. L. 
REV. 871, 873 (2010) (giving a history of the FTC Act and noting: “Today, the jurisdiction of the 
FTC over anticompetitive practices is well established. Not only does the Commission have explicit 
power to enforce the Clayton Act directly, but also the Supreme Court has held that the FTC’s power 
to condemn ‘unfair methods of competition’ covers everything that the Sherman Act covers and goes 
even further to reach a ‘penumbra’ of practices that are not covered by the Sherman Act.”). 
167.  Sandeen, supra note 9, at 496. 
168.  Supra note 143. 
 169. Compare Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493 
(2010) (describing the development of U.S. trade secret law), with Mark McKenna, Trademark Law’s 
Faux Federalism, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh, 
ed., 2013) (describing the development of trademark law). 
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trademark protection has expanded post-Erie, trade secret protection 
contracted with the adoption of the UTSA.170 
Of the types of unfair competition listed in the Restatement (Third) 
of Unfair Competition, the law governing rights of publicity is the only 
body of law that is governed exclusively by state statutory and common 
law.171 Since Erie, this law has continued to develop through the 
enactment of statutes by more states and the common law process, but in 
fits and starts.172 As a result, uniformity is mostly lacking. This body of 
law, then, serves as a stark example of what U.S. trademark and trade 
secret law might have looked like 80 years after Erie if policymakers and 
members of the bar had not intervened to pass the Lanham Act and the 
UTSA. When it comes to statutory solutions for perceived acts of unfair 
competition, it also suggests that policymakers and members of the bar 
are more motivated to protect the commercial interests of businesses than 
the privacy interests of individuals. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In many respects, unfair competition law in the United States today 
is much more robust than it was at the time Erie was decided in 1938, but 
that is not because of the common law development of state unfair 
competition law. Rather, it is because of the adoption and enforcement of 
federal and state unfair competition statutes, including the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, the Lanham Act, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and 
the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016. But while numerous unfair 
competition statutes exist and are enforced, they are also limited in ways 
that the amorphous and ever-changing common law is not. This is partly 
a result of Sears, Compco, and their progeny, but it is often by design as 
legislatures struggle to define the fine line between fair and unfair 
competition. Thus, two things are clear about the U.S. law of unfair 
competition eighty years after Erie: it is largely defined by state and 
federal statutes and it is limited in type and scope. 
170.  Sandeen, supra note 10, at 527–529. 
 171.  David S. Welkowitz & Tyler T. Ochoa, Teaching Rights of Publicity: Blending Copyright 
and Trademark, Common Law and Statutes, and Domestic and Foreign Law, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
905, 906–07 (2008) (“[U]nlike patent, trademark, and copyright, rights of publicity are governed by 
a patchwork quilt of state statutes and common-law decisions, rather than by a single federal 
statute; and unlike trade secret law, rights of publicity are not the subject of a uniform state law 
adopted in the vast majority of states, in addition to a federal criminal law.”). 
172.  JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC 
WORLD (2018). 
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